Locked Out of Forest City: An Infrastructure of Exclusion
Forest City, built atop four artificial islands with an estimated cost of around 100 billion USD, is one of the largest and most costly megaprojects in the world. It is a speculative urban project in Johor Bahru, Malaysia, which promises an “idyllic and technology-driven” modern utopia, complete with over 60 residential buildings, an international school, luxury hotels, office complexes and a mall (Introduction: Forest City). However, eight years since its conception, Forest City has an occupancy rate of less than 1% and is only 15% constructed – a current resident looking to move out calls it a ‘ghost city’; barren and devoid of activity (Marsh, 2023). The collapse of Forest City lies not just in its financial failure, but also in the fact that it is a monument to infrastructural exclusion.
[Image Description: A promotional rendering of Forest City released by Country Garden]
Forest City CGPV. (2023) Available at: https://forestcitycgpv.com/news/229-forest-city-special-financial-zone-will-drive-johor-s-thriving-development
The overlapping and divergent agendas of both local and foreign actors meant that the impact of the project itself was felt most powerfully by those farthest away from the decision-making process. Forest City had an immeasurable impact on nearby fishing villages as well as on local biodiversity and ecosystems, as construction began without any public consultation or even knowledge – Johor residents found out only when ships began dumping sand into their fishing grounds (Williams, 2016, p.4). Other local youths noted a sense of artificiality and alienation from the project, in that it had dramatically altered the villages’ heritage and created a ‘fake’ green environment in its place (Koh et al., 2021, p.1487). Anecdotal evidence showed that the village experienced water and electricity disruptions as well as local accidents caused by the construction vehicles operating literally ‘in their backyard’ (ibid, p.1488). At the same time, contractors began land reclamation without an approved Detailed Environmental Impact Assessment and directly onto a seagrass bed which had been marked for protection (Avery and Moser, 2023, p.226). Construction efforts contributed not only to the destruction of local Malay and indigenous Orang Asli fishing grounds but also increased sediment, worsening pollution and habitat destruction (ibid, p.227), showing a complete neglect of local and environmental concerns. The problem is, these were never a part of the authorities’ considerations to begin with.
[Image Description: Forest City under construction near the Johor shore]
Nikkei Asia. (2014) Available at: https://regional.co.id/2022/05/09/dihantam-pandemi-kelanjutan-megaproyek-forest-city-senilai-us100-miliar-makin-tidak-pasti/
Forest City was built on a partnership between the Sultan of Johor and Country Garden (one of China’s top property developers), all under the banner of the Belt and Road Initiative. The BRI is often criticised as an underhanded means of securing economic and political power over participating countries, but in this case, Malaysia’s government and political figures were just as complicit as commercial Chinese actors in the failure of Forest City. It was the Sultan himself who mediated the specific methods and terms of its implementation – not only was he the one to approach Chinese investors with the idea and enter the Forest City venture with 34% stake, but he was also key to the absolute disregard of local regulations and guidelines (Williams, 2016, p.4). At its core, Forest City is a private venture, motivated first and foremostly by profit. This enabled Country Garden and the Sultan to operate with almost no regard to Malaysians or the environment at all, and only prioritise the group of consumers thought to be able to rake in the most returns: foreign Chinese buyers. Forest City marketed itself almost exclusively to Chinese nationals, who were provided with showrooms in China as well as free investor tours organised by Country Garden - in 2016, they had bought 70% of all the units sold that year (Koh et al., 2021, p.1487). Malaysia’s then pro-Chinese investment government and the Sultan allowed further concessions to be extended to foreign buyers, such as fast-tracked visas, tax incentives and the sale of freehold properties as opposed to leaseholds, meaning that a buyer owned both the property and the land it was built on (Avery and Moser, 2023).
The subsequent efforts to rebrand and re-strategise by ‘Malaysianising’ physical and planned aspects of Forest City and including more environmental attractions was purely out of the need to mitigate financial risk after public opposition (ibid., p.233), without true care or concern for residents or the land it occupied. This is evident all over Forest City, because the properties remained financially out of reach for most Malaysians, with the infrastructure itself not ‘made for them’ because of the clear imitation of Chinese models of ‘green infrastructure’, rather than one that was truly inclusive or welcoming (Koh et al., 2021). The implicit message is one of exclusion; only certain people are part of Forest City’s grand vision of a utopian, gated city, and only some’s needs and desires have been catered to, whereas the struggles and costs borne by the entities on the periphery were made invisible and wholly ignored.
Too often are the social realities of such infrastructures overlooked, however, the question of responsibility is just as important as the question of whom this responsibility is owed to. In the case of Forest City, an infrastructure of exclusion was created not just through the denial of access to a physical place, but also underlying ideals of belonging on the basis of nationality, class and even species, as it was the lives of local Malaysians and the natural environment affected and excluded most. Malaysia already has a longstanding political context of entrenched transparency and corruption issues; there must be more curbs on both political and corporate greed and overreach, accountability checks on the actors involved and most importantly, extended consultation and feedback mechanisms with the communities and stakeholders involved. Achieving this in practice is a different matter altogether, but it is arguably necessary for infrastructure projects to produce truly beneficial and sustainable outcomes for the people and environments impacted.
Bibliography
Avery, E. and Moser, S. (2022). Urban speculation for survival: Adaptations and negotiations in Forest City, Malaysia. Environment and Planning C: Politics and Space, 41(2), p.239965442211217. doi:https://doi.org/10.1177/23996544221121797.
Forest City CGPV. (n.d.). Introduction: Forest City | Forest City Iskandar | Forest City Malaysia. [online] Available at: https://forestcitycgpv.com/about-forest-city/forest-city.
Koh, S.Y., Zhao, Y. and Shin, H.B. (2021). Moving the mountain and greening the sea: the micropolitics of speculative green urbanism at Forest City, Iskandar Malaysia. Urban Geography, 43(10), pp.1–27. doi:https://doi.org/10.1080/02723638.2021.1999725.
Marsh, N. (2023). Forest City: Inside Malaysia’s Chinese-built ‘ghost city’. www.bbc.com. [online] 4 Dec. Available at: https://www.bbc.com/news/business-67610677.
Williams, J.M.R. (2016). Evaluating Megaprojects: The Case of Forest City in Johor, Malaysia. Department of Urban Studies and Planning, Massachusetts Institute of Technology. [online] Available at: https://scienceimpact.mit.edu/sites/default/files/documents/Williams.pdf.
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