China Bans Japanese Seafood: A Microcosm of International Politics

Japan is amazing.

This is probably one thing most of us Hongkongers can agree on. And this sentiment is brainwashing and contagious. When I was young, I was exceedingly vocal about my disgust of Sashimi and Sushi, but the constant worshipping of Japanese seafood by my parents and closest friends eventually converted me into one of them.

So, imagine our shared horror when Japanese fish disappeared from Hong Kong. China and later Hong Kong slammed a total ban on Japanese fishery products in late August, after weeks of announcing the intent to do so. Us religious zealots swarmed Sushiro and Genki Sushi, weeks pre-dating and following the ban, to savour the supposedly distinct, unique taste of Japanese seafood that they would have no more. This was not supposed to happen. So why did it?

Join me on a deep dive into this medley of events: Japan release of nuclear wastewater and if it is as troublesome as it sounds, China’s reasons for harsh legislation, and the bigger picture of state relations behind this.

Japan’s release of Fukushima nuclear wastewater

Japan’s side of the story begins on March 11, 2011. The catastrophic Tōhoku Earthquake and the resulting tsunami caused all reactors at Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant to fail, with some reactors suffering from melted cores and explosions; this released radioactive material into the atmosphere, causing nuclear contamination to spread in Japan (USNRC, 2022). While the relocation of residents in radioactive areas, the search for missing citizens, and the reconstruction of areas affected by the disaster were key problems, the treatment of nuclear-contaminated water at Fukushima is the focus of the discussion today.

The now defunct power plant held 1.3 million metric tons of water, which existed to avoid a further meltdown of nuclear reactors and continued to cool them down. Accumulated wastewater must be released at some point, as water tanks are nearing capacity (Brumfiel & Londorf, 2023). As such, the Japanese Government has planned to decontaminate the wastewater before pumping it into the ocean. Japan announced the use of an Advanced Liquid Processing System (ALPS) to filter wastewater from Fukushima, before releasing it into the ocean, for which electric utility Tokyo Electric Power Company (TEPCO) is responsible. (Reuters, 2023). Japan then proceeded to ask the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to review and monitor the filtering process according to IAEA Safety Standards (IAEA, 2021). This was to ensure impartiality and transparency in the handling of this issue, to calm expected international anxieties about pollution and adverse effects on marine products.

Following Japan’s Nuclear Regulation Authority (NRA) and the IAEA’s approval of the process in May and July respectively, the first release of wastewater in Fukushima commenced on August 24, 2023, as planned by Japan. (IAEA, 2023). The second batch of treated wastewater was dispatched on October 5, 2023 (Reuters, 2023), and the third on November 2 (Au, 2023). This is a process that Japan plans to continue for decades until the decommissioning of the power plant is complete, and all treated water is discharged.

Japan’s rationale: the science behind the plan

In the IAEA report on ALPS-treated water at Fukushima, IAEA Director General Rafael Grossi stated that despite concerns, the wastewater pumped out “will have a negligible radiological impact on people and the environment” definitively. The report also noted the NRA’s similar rhetoric in their report, despite their concurrent and separate development. So how did this conclusion come about?

ALPS is a chemical process that seeks to remove radionuclides from the water. The 3 main steps include filtering to remove caesium and strontium, then desalination, followed by a complex procedure to remove radioactive materials with adsorption. Before a discharge, TEPCO’s measurement and confirmation facility samples the treated water, and has the sample analysed for the amount of various radionuclides present, except for tritium, and sees if it meets domestic regulations. Wastewater is further diluted with seawater before being released into the ocean (IAEA, 2023). So comes the critical question: did it work?

Greenpeace has criticised the water release for not fully considering the ecological and biological impacts of radionuclides carbon-14, strontium-90 and iodine-129, and the aforementioned radionuclide of tritium (Greenpeace, 2023). So, we spot 4 points of concern for the plan. According to TEPCO and the Japanese Government, the process eliminates strontium-90 and iodine-129 from the water (Reuters, 2023). The process also reduced carbon-14 levels to meet world standards. The main point of concern, tritium levels in wastewater, is reported to be about 1500 Bq/L (Wong, 2023), which is below the WHO’s standard of 10000 Bq/L for drinking water (Cabot, 2023). The readings of tritium concentrations in waters within a 90km radius of Fukushima Daiichi further supports the claim of safe tritium content, with all readings except for one showing concentrations of near 0 Bq/L, as of December 5, 2023 (NRA, 2023). Keep in mind that these readings postdate all discharges of ALPS water.

The broad concern for increased seawater radioactivity also seemed to be overblown in the face of other NRA data. Comparing data compiled before and after the discharges, not only were there no significant change in the levels of radioactive Cs-134 and Cs-137 in Tokyo Bay, but the same goes for general radioactivity concentration in offshore areas near Fukushima, maintaining a level of around 0.030 Bq/L (NRA, 2023). Marine soil radioactivity in said areas also saw no notable change, and data produced by the Fisheries Agency of Japan, as of December 5, also showed that there was 0 fish with radioactivity over 100 Bq/L, for both marine and freshwater fish species, out of a total 198,044 fish sampled in 2023 (JFA, 2023).

However, many have opposed and continue to disapprove and protest the policies, with some presenting science-based arguments against them. It should be noted that different countries set the tritium concentration acceptable for drinking water differently: France sets its at below 100Bq/L. Some have also claimed that the large quantity of tritium in seawater alone, not its concentration, is troubling (Cabot, 2023) Some are concerned about the side-effects of possible non-tritium impurities in treated water. These concerns may have stemmed from a public hearing of TEPCO and Japan’s plan for water discharge in 2018, where it was revealed that ‘tritiated water’ may still contain other radionuclides after treatment, which would violate regulations, contradicting TEPCO’s narrative then that the discharge would be safe to the environment (, 2018). This questions not only the competence of TEPCO, but their integrity. Greenpeace, a vehement critic of the plans, claims that radiological risks have not been fully assessed, that the IAEA had not sufficiently investigated how radioactive fuel debris affect wastewater, and that sufficient water storage space still exists, as admitted by the Japanese government (Greenpeace, 2023). With such piling criticism and distrust of the plans for discharge, I feel it would be fair and impartial to label the policies environmentally safe only to a moderate extent.

China’s prohibition of Japanese fishery imports

On August 24, the day Japan discharged ALPS treated water at Fukushima Daiichi into the ocean, the General Administration of Customs of China (GACC) decided to “completely suspend the import of aquatic products originating in Japan” (GACC, 2023). The government of Hong Kong mirrored the move by banning Japanese seafood imports from 10 Japanese prefectures on the same day (Chan, 2023). This was predated by weeks of China voicing concerns over the environmental impacts of the discharge and warning of an incoming ban if the discharge is to go through.

After the IAEA report approved Japanese discharge plans, the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ Spokesperson on July 4 remarked that the IAEA report should neither serve as “a recommendation nor an endorsement" of the policies, noting the report was the result of a request from the Japanese Government. The spokesperson raised sharp questions and fierce accusations about Japan going through with the plan, despite an unestablished level of international transparency of possible violations of radioactivity limits, untold long-term consequences of radionuclide build up from wastewater disposals, and the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) stipulating an obligation to protect the marine environment (Mao, 2023). The spokesperson’s remarks on August 24 were more belligerent and damning, labelling the Japanese plans “selfish”, “irresponsible” and “right-infringing” in respect to not neighbouring nations, but also the international community and all world citizens (Wang, 2023). On both occasions spokespersons refer to the to-be-disposed ALPS-treated water as “nuclear-contaminated water”, which is an interpretation shared by all Chinese officials that have spoken on the matter. In these remarks, China’s through line stance on the matter can be observed: The Japanese plans are hasty and filled with unknowns, and the execution of this plan reveals the Japanese government’s inflexible, inconsiderate and self-serving character.

Is the radioactivity concern the only motive for legislation?

China’s position is clearly science-based objection and condemnation of Japanese plans, as such an act disregards the wellbeing of not only Japanese but also neighbouring citizens (i.e. the Chinese), which is the view held and continually repeated by many scientists and politicians worldwide. But does what they say match what they think? We can make three observations that question such an assumption.

To begin with, it appears that North American countries would be affected first and foremost by the discharges, not China. Taking oceanic currents into account, the water in the Northern half of the Pacific Ocean seems to flow in an enormous clockwise pattern. The North Pacific current travels from Japan towards Canada and the US. That then splits into the Oyashio and California currents respectively: one travels from the west coast of Canada back to Northern Japan via Alaska and the Russian Far East, while the other surges downwards and backwards towards California and then Hawaii, then makes its way back to East Asia. Only then, by this logic, does seawater and by extension the majority of nuclear wastewater from Fukushima, reach China, via the Yellow Sea warm current (Mao, 2023). This process would take around 1 or 2 years. A small fraction of water from Fukushima would travel immediately towards Taiwan and Southern China via a minor current. (TTV, 2023). Yet neither Canada, the US or Taiwan has immediately sought to impose any restrictions on Japanese fishery imports, and have displayed no intent to do so in the future.

In addition, China has many nuclear power plants (NPPs) that release water containing radionuclides, especially tritium, of which Chinese plants emit much more than Japan’s. Secretary-General of Taiwan’s Nuclear Safety Commission Wang Chong-de states that China annually produces 7 to 8 times the amount of tritium that Japan does (Chen, 2023), with most Chinese power plants, such as the Qinshan and the Yangjiang NPPs emitting close to or over 100 billion bq of tritium per year, via gas emissions and mainly liquid disposals (Consulate-General of Japan in Hong Kong, 2021). While Wang is not wagging fingers at China and accusing them of hypocrisy, as the same article mentions him noting that the waters near China’s NPPs have not undergone notable nuclear contamination, the information he gives does indicate that China cannot reasonably criticise Japanese policies with prominent tritium-related concerns raised by many others, as China is doing the exact same, and at an even larger scale.

And finally, Chinese fishermen have been spotted fishing near Japan, even after the embargo was implemented. On September 22, the US ambassador in Japan posted a photo of Chinese boats fishing in waters northwest of Okinawa on September 15. Other Chinese fishing vessels, especially saury fishing boats, have been detected by Global Fishing Watch in waters where Japanese boats also operate (Inoue, 2023). While the larger oceanic current does carry the bulk of tritiated water and possibly other radionuclides towards North America, a branch current does redirect seawater from Japan southwards towards, which theoretically undermines the quality of fish in the area. China’s post-ban fishing presence in waters near Japan is a puzzling occurrence, and this seems to defeat the point of the embargo, which was originally justified by an argument of scientific scrutiny.

This suggests that there might be alternative motives for legislation. As many have observed, the issue around Fukushima has been heavily politicised. And this lies at the crux of China’s decision to impose such a drastic measure.

The bigger picture of geopolitics

The perspective that I am offering requires an understanding of the region’s modern history, as I believe the starting point of this explanation to be the end of the Second World War, when the rivalry between China and the then-global hegemon, the US, was ignited.

In 1949, the Chinese Communist Party toppled the Chinese Nationalist Party from power, bringing the 3-decade Chinese Civil War to a close. For the US, who was then tangled in an emerging and intensifying geopolitical clash against fellow communist-ruled Soviet Union, this was interpreted as a distressing turn of events that mandated more aggressive action to contain the spread of communism in Asia. Shortly after in 1950, the Korean war, a conflict that saw the US army directly in combat against China’s, exploded. The aftermath of it saw the US establishing a military presence in the Republic of Korea (South Korea), as they had done in Japan after the World War. Having 2 countries host the army of a superpowered rival laid the foundations for the modern conflict between China and the US, that some are starting to call a second “Cold War”.

In only decades’ time, China grew from a nation ravaged by famine and societal chaos, to one of the largest economies of the world, and in the world’s eyes, garnering the status of a superpower. To the US, the rapid militarisation of China that followed suit, and the perceived domineering Asian policy of China, which included territory disputes with Japan, and the supposedly invasive assertion that large swathes of the South China Sea are China’s territorial waters, was a piercing challenge towards the US-led world order that have stood for half a century. As such, in recent years, the US has started to take action to restore said order.

On the economic aspect, the US has strengthened its alliances with Asian countries. Aside from increasing trade and prioritising partnerships with Japan, South Korea, Singapore, Vietnam, the Philippines etc, the US has also become a significant direct investor of ASEAN. President Joe Biden’s administration has gone one step further in 2022 by establishing the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF), an economic pact with 11 Asian countries and Australia that promotes inter-group trade. This has been seen by many, including US citizens, as a move to counterbalance its rival China’s influence in Asia (Kemp, 2023).

On the international security aspect, the US has promptly expanded its military presence in Asia. Notable acts include the increased Quadrilateral Security Dialogue between the US, Japan, Australia and India that started in 2007, involving joint naval exercises and exchange of views on global issues, and the formation of a trilateral defence pact between the US, Japan and South Korea in 2023, known as the Camp David Principles (Garamone, 2023). Perhaps the most noteworthy action the US has taken near China is the implementation of multiple “island-chain” defence strategies against China. There was a widely known US military build-up in South Korea, Japan’s various islands, Taiwan and the Philippines, which forms the First Island Chain (Georgulis, 2022). The second and third island chains include various US-allied island nations such as Palau and Fiji, as well as US territories such as American Samoa and heavily fortified Guam (Sodhi, 2022).

To China, the US is the aggressor, not themselves. The China policy of the US is seen both as a case of economic exclusion and militant geographic encirclement. A map of the pacific shows US influence in almost all neighbouring countries on its coastline: their biggest rival has approached their doorstep. This perception has extended into this issue, especially as the South Korean government, defying public disdain and mass demonstrations against discharge policies, has voiced its acceptance of IAEA’s assessment (Kim, 2023), and the US military has started bulk-buying Japanese fish to counter China’s embargo (Bhattacharya, 2023). In China’s eyes, these actions are just the newest of a long line of offences from an explicitly anti-China alliance.

And so, facing Western-allied encroachment at sea, against a backdrop of a slowly worsening economic crisis, and historical frictions between Japan and China unforgotten, ultra-nationalistic flames are ready to be fanned. China, fuelled by anger and hurt, uses this incident as a justification of lashing out. In reality, similar to prior US or Chinese moves, this is just the tip of the iceberg, a pawn push in a continual game of geopolitical chess, between the behemoth players.

Conclusion

This piece seeks only to explain the conflict between China and Japan on this issue, and not discuss how justified the embargo on Japanese fishery products is. The distinction between the official Chinese position and their underlying rationale is done to facilitate a complete understanding of the issue at hand, and especially the Chinese perspective of it, and does not serve to judge it. One thing that can be said for certain is that China, whether the ban is within reason or not, and perceived as such or not, will not back down from it for the meantime.

Oh well, I guess we’re not getting our fish back now. Guess we’ll just have to spend a few extra bucks for that. Expect us in Tokyo very soon.

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