The ASEAN Way: Boon or bane?
On the 26th October, Trump was warmly greeted by an entourage of Malaysian dancers and officials. Here to attend the 47th rendition of the ASEAN Summit, Trump’s arrival at the Summit was highly anticipated by regional leaders. With ASEAN existing as a viable platform for Southeast Asian countries to come together, Trump’s arrival at the annual ASEAN Summit was lauded across the region as an opportunity for greater cooperation in trade and potential brokering of a peace deal in the Cambodia-Thai border crisis. Yet, the extent to which ASEAN relies on such foreign powers in honing its regional authority is a cause for concern.
ASEAN fundamentally functions on principles of non-interference and respect for sovereignty. Deemed the “ASEAN Way”, this underlies much of ASEAN’s decision-making processes, where most diplomacy is carried out through informal means, closed-door sessions and personal relationships between leaders. This sentiment is enshrined in the ASEAN Charter established in 2008, essentially providing a legal basis for ASEAN’s unique style of diplomacy. Due to the nature of the ASEAN Way, much of ASEAN’s decisions rely on friendship and consensus-building when it comes to resolving disputes. In this sense, the ASEAN Way is beneficial in that it creates a veil of peace across the region. While bilateral disputes and grievances are speckled across the region, Southeast Asian countries are ostensibly still bound by friendship within the organisation. ASEAN thus binds Southeast Asian countries into familial-like relationships: even though minor grievances exist, nothing egregious can come out of a heated argument.
Yet, what happens when no one wants to budge? What underlies this veneer of friendship and consensus is a susceptibility to practical paralysis. With focus on peaceful resolution of disputes through informal means, there lacks a proper mechanism in mediating disputes when no one wishes to give way. Multiple trade disputes between ASEAN members have seen their resolution lie not in ASEAN’s dispute resolution structure, but in external, international organisations. For instance, in 2008 where Thailand lodged a complaint through the World Trade Organisation (WTO) on the Philippines’ taxation methods on imported cigarettes. While seemingly trivial and minor, their avoidance of ASEAN’s economic dispute resolution mechanisms, and instead selection of WTO, displayed more confidence in WTO in providing a proper resolution to the dispute.
Furthermore, the non-interference principle implies that ASEAN countries are not obligated to adhere to agreed consensus, as it entails that other members of ASEAN are unable to interfere should consensus be violated. When the Tatmadaw seized control of Burma in 2021, the world watched on as ASEAN displayed their sheer inability to enforce the Five-Point Consensus on the Burmese military junta. With the military junta being a not so familiar face in ASEAN, their foreigner status in this “family” undoubtedly created less of an obligation for the delegation of Burma to cooperate. As the complexities of Burmese unrest continues to unfold, the tangled web of opinions coming from various ASEAN leaders and the lack of cooperation from Burmese leadership continue to paralyse ASEAN’s resolve.
With ASEAN’s poor track record of successful dispute resolution between countries, the influence of big foreign powers is necessitated. In the recent ASEAN Summit, the Cambodia-Thailand border dispute showcases how the ASEAN Way continually begets the interference of foreign powers in Southeast Asia.
Historically rooted in lapses in French demarcations of the Thai Cambodian border, the border dispute between Cambodia and Thailand continues to endure, with it recently being sensationalised in a leaked phone call between then-Thai Prime Minister Paetongtarn and Cambodian leader Hun Sen. While a seemingly simple border dispute, it remains a century-old source of tension between the neighbours due to their diverging positions on international intervention. Despite Thailand’s insistent on a bilateral resolution utilising their already established Joint Boundary Commission, Cambodia continues to make advances in internationalising their dispute. Bringing the ownership of the Preah Vihear Temple to the International Court of Justice (ICJ), taking the case to the United Nations Security Council, Cambodia is aggressively airing their dirty laundry for the world to clean. Escalating border skirmishes continued to plague the neighbours’ souring relationship.
It was only recently at the 2025 Summit that the Kuala Lumpur Peace Accord, that enshrined a comprehensive ceasefire agreement, where a ceasefire was officially declared. Trump’s presence was no coincidence: having shown interest in mediating the conflict on the platform X in the earlier months, overseeing a peace resolution would only continue to bolster his portfolio for the Nobel Peace Prize. From a wider perspective, his attendance at the ASEAN Summit would also facilitate trade talks between Southeast Asia and the US, given his implemented economic policies, where the US can further their geopolitical interests in opposition with China. Yet, Trump’s overseeing of the ceasefire agreement can be seen as a slap to ASEAN’s face: while ASEAN is perpetually unable to bring proper resolution to their conflicts, Trump is able to sashay into regional meetings and declare peace in simply a showmanship move.
Perhaps ASEAN functions simply as a structure that keeps these squabbling Southeast Asian siblings together – family, one might even call it. Yet, there is a fine line to tread between allowing foreign powers to mediate disputes and allowing foreign powers to dominate entirely. ASEAN teeters precariously on that line. When what it took was to have Trump oversee a peace declaration that he had little part in creating, ASEAN jumped at the opportunity. Their need to rely on foreign powers to bolster their authority, represents a greater structural weakness in ASEAN’s political and security mechanism.
How much Southeast Asia is willing to be a pawn in this game of bipolar global politics depends on ASEAN itself. Does it wish to crack down on its constitutional weaknesses and channel greater authority in regional affairs? Or does it wish to continue relying on foreign mediation at the expense of being a stage for big power politics? Down ASEAN’s current path, the latter seems more plausible. Whether ASEAN should seek to legitimise and strengthen their authority in the region depends on the extent to which it places importance on its own power. And perhaps for now, the most reasonable course of action is to ride the waves of the volatile global political and economic order.
